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Kremlin’s recognition of independence of breakaway regions South Ossetia and Abkhazia fueled talks about 
Russia’s recovery as a great power.  However, an actual assessment of the situation demonstrates that Russia 
will loose more than it will gain from military victory against Georgia and sequent steps Russia undertook.  
In the aftermath of the military conflict between Russia and Georgia which received almost no support from the 
West, columnists started to speak about a new Russian foreign policy level: Moscow demonstrated to the world 
that it can act unilaterally in the post-soviet space even if it contradicts the interests of the USA and EU. Such 
assessment  of  the situation  is especially  evident  in Russia where  the restoration of  the international  status 
enjoyed during USSR era has been announced. However,  one can agree only with the proposition about the 
new foreign policy level.  One can hardly agree with the second claim that Moscow’s victory in Georgia and 
recognition of separatist Georgian regions mark a restoration of Russia’s power in the post-soviet space. Let us 
look at this issue intently.   
New Russian foreign policy
After V. Putin came to power in 2000 it was clear that he would abandon closer relations with the West - the 
foreign policy course that B. Jeltsin advocated. Temporary improvement in relations after September 11 and 
friendship  with  EU was  tactical  steps  based  on pragmatic  calculations  to enhance  power  and influence.  V. 
Putin’s speech in Munich in 2007 in which he outright criticized Western countries (especially USA) for their 
unilateral actions on the international scene revealed apparent essence of the new Russian foreign policy. This 
essence is a creation of a multipolar world in which Russia would have the same status and influence in making 
international  policy as USA, EU or China. The most important condition to achieve this, according to Russian 
strategists, is the restoration of the control over the post-soviet area. Post-soviet area is considered as a territory 
of the Commonwealth of the Independent States (CIS) and control of this area means control over decisions in 
political, economic and social spheres in these countries. For a long time Russia used its “soft power” means to 
influence members of the CIS: energetic pressure, economic control by taking over important enterprises, direct 
support of the individual politicians, control of information and using the leverage of Russian minorities living 
in  the  CIS.  We  have  to  acknowledge  that  this  tactic  was  successful  and  Kremlin  managed  to  maintain  its 
influence over CIS countries or at least not to let them turn to the West. Such actions in parallel with flirt with 
the  largest  EU  countries  and  avoidance  of  the  conflict  with  Washington  allowed  Russia  to  strengthen  its 
international  positions.  Russia  entered  the  G-7,  its  economy  has  been  growing  fast,  Russia’s  voice  in 
international  forums was heard. Russia increased its international  positions step by step and approached its 
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vision of a multipolar international world. Knowing the history of recent Russian foreign policy, the use of the 
military measures is a new step, but it is a question, whether an advantageous one. 
Pyrrhic victory in South Ossetia
Russian military  invasion in South Ossetia  was  the  greatest  strategic  mistake.  Russia crucified  Georgia  that 
refused to obey by using military force. There’s no doubt that Russia’s military victory in South Ossetia can be 
estimated as a sign to the world that Russia is a strong and powerful country ready to fight for its interests by 
any means.  However,  it appears that this will cost Russia a lot. There are several  aspects  showing why such 
Russia’s actions could be estimated as harmful for the implementation of its strategic interests.
First, Russia damaged its image in the post-soviet space. Countries like Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, Azerbaijan 
are still balancing between East and West, which means Russia’s control over these countries hasn’t reached 
proper level yet (according to Russia’s perception).  Color revolutions,  dictator’s A. Lukashenka recent actions 
tell that the post-soviet space is not consolidated yet as Russia’s “sphere of influence”. It appears that Kremlin’s 
decision  to  tackle  military  Georgian  disobedience  will  cast  a  chill  in  Moscow’s  relations  with  the  above 
mentioned countries. Ukraine has Crimea, Azerbaijan – Nagorno Karabakh, Moldova – Transnistria, Belarus has 
nothing,  but  A. Lukashenka is eager  to stay in power.  If  Kremlin once decided to use force,  no one can be 
insured against  the further  use of  military  power.  In this  context  it  is  expected that  these countries  would 
become more open to the West as a protector from Russian actions. Russia sends the intimidating signs itself – 
a  statement  that  Transnistria  issue  is  only  a  question  of  time  –  and  these  signs  boost  fear.  Thus,  Russia 
demonstrated its power to the world, but intimidated strategically important “near abroad” countries. In turn, it 
will aggravate its power consolidation in strategically important region.
Second,  war  in Georgia  will  put  on ice Russia’s  relations  with  the  West.  G-7 already  condemns  Russia  and 
criticizes its decision to recognize independence of separatist regions. Having in mind the fact that namely the 
West  is  the  reason  of  Russia’s  economy  growth,  such  estrangement  will  not  be  advantageous  to  Russia. 
Although in short term any serious consequences for Russia will hardly occur (especially having in mind the 
speed of decision making process in EU), in the long term perspective the West may change its position towards 
Russia.  Moscow  understands  this  well  and  is  looking  for  the  allies  in  the  East.  The  summit  of  Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization is starting these days. Apparently Russia will try to get support from Beijing, Astana, 
or even Deli and Islamabad. However, even if support is given, it will likely be limited to oral statements. China 
itself wants to retain its great power status no less than Russia, it has Tibet and Taiwan, moreover, interests of 
both countries in the Far East do not always coincide. Thus, by embroiling into the war with Georgia, Russia 
took a step towards self-isolation.  
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Whether  Moscow  has  enough  capabilities  to  continue  the  chosen  foreign  policy  course  self-sufficiently  – 
without cooperating with its economic partners in the West – remains unanswered. It seems that to achieve 
this goal alone will be more challenging than by maintaining friendly international relations. This conclusion 
lets us claim that Russia’s actions during the South Ossetia conflict allowed to win a battle but weakened its 
positions  in  the  war.  Russia  tore  South  Ossetia  (8  600  km²)  and  Abkhazia (3  900  km²)  from  Georgia,  but 
probably lost Ukraine (603 700 km²) and other territories. Thus, it can be said that Moscow’s actions during the 
war with Georgia equal to the cutting of the branch on which it is seated.                          
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